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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
In his Opening Brief, Mr. Nevarez set forth that the manner in which the district court 
deprived hiin of the expert services required to present an adequate defense in this case was 
fundamentally unfair, unconstitutional, and legally deficient. Additionally, Mr. Nevarez 
established there was no reasonable and articuiabie suspicion that he and the other occupants of 
the vehicle were the robbers of the convenience store when Deputy Moore effectuated the traffic 
stop. In response, the State suggests that because the district court referenced the due process 
clause in denying Mr. Nevarez's request for the appointment of an expert witness that the 
decision to do so was an exercise of sound discretion. Similarly, the State argues that Deputy 
Moore's purported observation of "furtive movements" and their "keen interest" in him as a law 
enforcement officer constitutes reasonable suspicion even though the only match to the general 
description given by dispatch was the occupants' ethnicity. 
A. The District Court Erred in Denving Mr. Nevarez's Motioi~ for Apportionment of 
Funds for Expert Witness. 
As Mr. Nevarez explained in his Opening Brief, because the assistance of an expert 
witness at state expense was necessary for the development of a significant element of his 
defense as an indigent defendant, the Due Process Clause warranted granting his request. It 
cannot be argued, nor did the State attempt to do so, that Mr. Nevarez did not make a threshold 
showing that the assistance sought had probable value to address what would be a significant 
issue in the case. See State v. Martin, --- P.3d ----, 2008 WL 2670190 (2008). The record 
unequivocally shows that the importance of challenging Deputy Moore's factual findings was not 
only important but also dispositive in this case. 
Furthermore, as established in Mr. Nevarez's Opening Brief, the district court abused its 
discretion because its decision denying his motion was not supported by the circumstances of the 
case and the wrong standard was applied. Nevertheless, the State asserts that the district court's 
passing reference to the Due Process Clause wins the day. Though the district court did mention 
the standard of "fundainental fairness" secured by the Due Process Clause, it remains unclear 
whether the district court actually evaluated the issue from this perspective. What is clear is that 
the district court in making its determination employed an analysis under I.R.E. 702 and State v. 
Perry, 139 Idaho 520,81 P.3d 1220 (2003). Again, in Perry the issue was whether I.R.E. 702 
precluded a polygrapher from testifying about a polygraph examination taken by the defendant. 
In this case, the question presented to Judge Melanson was whether the Due Process Clause 
warranted the appointment of an expert witness so Mr. Nevarez could present a defense. 
Moreover, the prejudice suffered by Mr. Nevarez as a result of the district court's error 
cannot be overlooked. Before the Hon. Judge Melanson, the district judge presiding over the 
motion for apportionment of funds, the prosecuting attorney suggested that the court should first 
listen to the testimony presented upon the motion to suppress, then if the district court finds that 
the assistance of an expert would be beneficial, it could then appoint the expert as requested by 
Mr. Nevarez. AF Tr. P. 12. Later, before the Hon. Barry Wood, the district judge presiding over 
the motion to suppress, the prosecutor took advantage of the situation and argued "the officer's 
testimony is uncontroverted in this case with respect to what he observed." MS Tr. p. 65. Judge 
Wood noted for the record that he was not the judge that denied the motion for the appointment 
of the expert but nevertheless went on to adopt theuncontroverted factual circumstai~ces as set 
forth by Deputy Moore. MS Tr. p. 78-79. 
Mr. Nevarez's right to present a defense in this case and his right to fundamental fairness 
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as embedded in the Due Process Clause were violated. Additionally, the district court's decision 
was an abuse of discretion and must be reversed. 
B. The District Court Erred in Denvin~ Mr. Nevarez's Motion to Suppress 
In its responsive brief, the State argues the stop in this case was justified by the "furtive 
movemeilts" of the occupants of the vehicle and their "keen interest" in Deputy Moore. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 9. Additionally, the State suggests that this case is indistinguishable from 
State v. Gascon, 119 Idaho 932,812 P.2d 239 (1991) and State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125,44 
P.3d 1180 (Ct. App. 1992). Because Mr. Nevarez explained in his Opening Brief why any 
reliance on Gascon would be misplaced and how it is factually distinguishable from this case, 
time will not be spent repeating those differences. With regard to Butcher, its inapplicability to 
this case is set forth below. 
In Butcher, law enforcement officers in Twin Falls, Idaho, were informed that a nearby 
convenience store had just been robbed. Id. at 129-30,44 P.3d 1184-85. They were told that the 
suspects were two men, including one who was "Hispanic-looking . . . five foot seven inches tall, 
between twenty-five and thirty years old with a Fu-Manchu style mustache." Id. The other 
suspect was white, thinner, at least six feet tall, and possibly wearing a blue hooded sweatshirt. 
Id. Minutes later an officer observed a vehicle being driven by a "Hispanic-looking male with a 
Fu-Manchu style mustache" along with a "male passenger [that] was a slender looking white 
male with a ponytail." Id. at 130, 44 P.3d 1185. The officer followed the suspects for 
approximately three miles and eventually effectuated a high risk stop of the vehicle. The Butcher 
Court justified the stop, stating: 
[The officer] was aware that a crime had been committed based on the 
dispatcher's report. He also had a general description of the two suspects. Within 
a reasonable proximity to the time and place of the crime, he observed a car-the 
only car to pass him following the radio report of the robbery-canying two 
persons matching the general description of the two robbery suspects. 
Id. (Emphasis added.) 
Contrary to the facts in Butcher, here Deputy Moore was able to confirm only one detail 
in the general description, that being the reported ethnicity of the suspects. The information 
possessed by Deputy Moore, as conveyed by dispatch, was that two Hispanic individuals with 
hooded sweatshirts, bandannas, stocking caps and a dark pistol had just robbed a convenience 
store in Rupert and were last seen traveling on foot. MS Tr. p. 27. Deputy Moore in turn 
observed four Hispanic males with bald heads drive past him. There was no match with regard 
to the number of suspects or their gender, let alone confirmation of any physical characteristics as 
was the case in Butcher. In that case, law enforcement's hunch rose to the level of reasonable 
and articulable suspicion when, in addition to proximity and being the only car on the road, the 
officer was able to accurately confirm specific details that were known about the suspects. This 
was not the situation in this case and the analogy of this case to either Gascon or Butcher is 
untenable. Here the only articulable fact matching the description given by dispatch was the 
ethnicity of the individuals. 
Still, the State argues reasonable suspicion arose because of purported "furtive 
movements" and a "keen interest" they expressed in Deputy Moore. As set forth in his initial 
briefing, and setting aside the question of whether Deputy Moore could actually make the 
observations he testified to, the observed movements in the vehicle in this case are not furtive. 
Moreover, law enforcement cannot simply utter magic words in questionable cases to justify an 
unconstitutional seizure. As articulated by Judge Schwarzman, "some vague reference to a so- 
called 'furtive movement' [does not] elevate the relatively innocuous and innocent behavior the 
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officer observed (or thought he observed) into the realm of 'reasonable suspicion."' Herndandez 
V .  State, 132 Idaho 352,972 P.2d 730 (Ct. App. 1999) (Schwartznlan, J., specially concurring) 
(citing People v. Superior Couvt of Yolo County, 3 Cal.3d 807, 91 Cal.Rptr. 729,478 P.2d 449 
(1970)). 
Similarly, citizens taking notice of law enforcement's presence does not constitute 
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. United States v. Montgomery, 561 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (circling a block and watching law enforcement in the rear view mirror is "too innocuous 
to warrant the intrusion of a temporary seizure for questioning"). As with Deputy Moore's 
reliance on furtive movements, observing law enforcement or even expressing a keen interest in 
their presence is not evidence of criminal activity. 
In light of the totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure, Deputy Moore did 
not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individuals in the vehicle were the 
robbers of the convenience store in Rupert. Instead, Deputy Moore had nothing more than a 
hunch and conjecture. Therefore, lacking reasonable and articulable suspicion, the seizure of the 
vehicle in this case was unconstitutional 
111. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Nevarez's Opening Brief, this Court should 
reverse the District Court's denial of his Motion for Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness 
and Motion to Suppress, and remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings 
I 
Respectfully submitted this & day of November, 2008. 
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